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Closing Remarks at the End of the
American Ideals Course
[Generally the course known as the Development of Ameri-
can Ideals was given in two semesters. In the Fall term, ILR
308 was devoted to a study of the chief constitutional princi-
ples in civil liberties and civil rights as they were expressed
and applied in leading Supreme Court cases. In the Spring
term, ILR 309 was devoted to a study of some of the origins
of the constitutional principles. It was a course essentially
in intellectual history. The readings included some books
of the Bible, Greek and Roman classics, books by Renais-
sance authors, John Locke, and Emerson. In the academic
year 1974-75, the last year in which Milton Konvitz taught,
both parts of the course were offered in the Fall semester,
and some hundreds of students took ILR 308 and 309 on
successive days.]
AT END OF ILR-309-
AMERICAN IDEALS COURSE
Tuesday, December 3, 1974
Well, we have come to the end of our semester's work; butit
is also the end of my giving this course, and tomorrow, as I
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end my lecture in my other American Ideals course, which
some of you are taking, but most of you perhaps are not, I
will leave my vocation as a teacher. I will become a Profes-
sor Emeritus in fact and not only in name.
But just as William James believed in an unfinished
universe, so I believe that no course of study is ever finished,
and no worthwhile work is ever completed. As James said in
a famous passage:
The word "and" trails along after every sentence. Some-
thing always escapes. "Ever not quite" has to be said of the
best attempts made anywhere in the universe at attaining
all-inclusiveness.
And yet the human mind and the human heart seek all-
inclusiveness, wholeness. This is why we look for the uni-
versal in the particular, why we so desperately seek to find a
law that would embrace whatever we know and whatever
we do. The soul always reaches out for infinity. It is like
listening to a great symphony, or sometimes even only to a
lovely melody: when it is ended, the notes continue, the
inner ear continues to listen, the heart seeks to penetrate the
great, infinite silence that is always the beyond.
And if I may end on a personal note-and so it will be
with me. I stop whatever it is that I am doing, and what I
have been doing for 37 years, 29 of them here at this univer-
sity. Just as the clock tells us toenda lecture, so the calendar
tells us to end teaching. But the word "and" trails along-
my life and my work are by no means finished. The task-
master is still persistent. There is more work to be done, and
there are more days to dawn.
When William James found in New Hampshire, in the
region of the White Mountains, a house that he knew at
once he wanted to have as a summer home, he wrote to his
family about it. "Oh," he wrote, "it is the most delightful
house you ever saw; it has fourteen doors all opening
outside."
Essentially, what I have tried to do in this American
Ideals course is to take you into a house with ever so many
doors, and all of them opening to the outside. The greatest
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deprivation is that which we impose upon ourselves-our
self-made prisons, the doors that we ourselves close and
lock, and after a while we sometimes even throwaway the
key, so that by the time the end comes, we discover that we
had not even lived. If you take anything away with you from
the course, let it be this: let your life be a house with at least
14 doors, and all of them opening to the outside.
And as for me, there are still many doors that I have not
yet walked through. They are beckoning, and I hope that I
still have enough of the spirit of adventure that will take me
through some of them. Like Thoreau, I long ago seem to
have lost a hound, a bay horse, and a turtle-dove, and am
still on their trail. This is why I must walk through more
doors. And I hope that you will do the same all the days of
your life.
AT END OF ILR-308-
AMERICAN IDEALS COURSE
Wedsnesday, December 4, 1974
I have only a few minutes left. You will forgive me if I put
aside my notes for the course and say a few personal words.
As I put aside my notes for the American Ideals course, I
do so with the awareness that I shall not ever again be
teaching it. I cannot help but think back to the day, well
over thirty years ago, when I first began to offer a course in
civil rights. I was then teaching at the New York University
Law School, where my course subjects were in the public
law and in the philosophy of law areas. I recall one day
going to the Dean, myoId friend Frank H. Sommer, whose
name I mention in this context reverently, to ask him if he
would allow me to offer a course in civil rights, and he
readily agreed. I believe that this was, as far as I could find
out, the first course in civil rights offered anywhere in the
United States. There was no casebook, there were no text-
books, there were some federal statUtes from the Recon-
struction days that were at that time dead letters, there were
some state civil rights acts that were seldom enforced, and
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there were some Supreme Court decisions, mainly of a 19th
century vintage. But the course broke ground, and I con-
tinued to teach the subject at New York University, and in
1944 at the same time introduced it into the curriculum of
the New School for Social Research on the level of adult
education.
In 1946, when I started to teach at Cornell, the course
broadened out into one on civil liberties as well as on civil
rights, and after several years it became the American Ideals
course in its two different but related aspects, known as
ILR-308 and 309.
When I published in 1952 the first edition of the Bill of
Rights Reader, it was the first casebook in the field. I believe
that its publication helped professors in law schools and in
government departments to offer courses based on the
book-at least that is what I have been told. Today there are
other casebooks, and courses in civil liberties and civil
rights are offered in literally hundreds of institutions, and
efforts are now being made to have these subjects placed
into the curriculum of even American high schools.
I have watched these developments with the greatest
satisfaction, but no credit for them belongs to me. I see,
however, in these developments a sign of the strength of the
human spirit, to which the principles of liberty and equal-
ity are among the deepest concerns.
This American Ideals course has been, admittedly, my
central interest, as you can see, for almost all of the 37 years
of my life as a teacher. Almost everyone of my books, seven
out of eight, have been derived from the course, and in turn
have been read back into the course. It has not been an
abstract interest, but has been part of the very tissue of
myself. In keeping it current, as I have, it has kept me
current. In keeping it alive and fresh, it has kept me alive
and fresh. As you can see, Emerson's Law of Compensation
has worked beautifully in this case.
I have, of course, deep and complex feelings about hav-
ing come to the end of my teaching career. I will not try to
analyze my feelings; there can be such a thing, I believe, as
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too much subjectivity-which is not healthy. But believe
me, one thing I do not feel, and that is self-pity. This is a
poison which all my instincts reject.
If there is anyone feeling that predominates, I am sure
that it is a deep feeling of gratitude. In the religious tradi-
tion which is my own, we are required, when we reach an
event significant in one's personal life, to utter a blessing
that thanks the Giver of Gifts for the gift of life that has
brought one to the happy event. It is this emotion of thanks-
giving that I feel most of all at this moment.
For I have been among the most fortunate of men. I have
spent my days and years doing exactly what I so much
wished to do. Instead of the State of New York and Cornell
University paying me, I should have been willing to pay
them for having allowed me to do the work I most wanted to
do. I have never learned the difference between work and
play, between work and leisure, between daytime work and
nighttime relaxation-I never knew where one ended and
the other began.
I say all this so that you may know that my interests are
not of a kind that I can suddenly drop them. I shall go on
with my work. Schopenhauer said that essentially a thinker
has only one or two ideas, and then he spends his entire life
trying to understand them, to unravel them, to explain
them to himself and to others. I still have a lot of work on
the one or two ideas that lance acquired, and I intend to
work on them in the future as I have in the past.
I cannot help but recall some lines from Tennyson's
"Ulysses":
Tho' much is taken, much abides; and tho'
We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are;
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.
As I leave you, I look upon you as representatives of the
many thousands of students whom I have been privileged
and honored to have had over the years, and I want to thank
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you for all the supremely wonderful things that you have
brought to me and done to me. You have taught me many
lessons-lessons in courtesy, consideration, mutuality of
regard and respect, mutuality of honor, mutuality of
human dignity. For these and so much else that is beyond
expression, you have my sincerest thanks.
Change and Tradition-
A Letter to David Daiches
[In the late 1940s and early 1950s, David Daiches, noted
English scholar and critic, was a professor of English litera-
ture at Cornell. The February 1951 issue of Commentary
published an article by Daiches, in which he attempted to
explain the reasons for his disavowal of traditional Judaism
and of religious belief generally. Several months later David
Daiches and Milton Konvitz scheduled a public discussion
or debate over the issues raised by Daiches. Their joint
appearance attracted many hundreds of students and
faculty members to the Memorial Room of Willard Straight
Hall, the Student Union at Cornell, an event remembered
by everyone who was present. In May 1951 Commentary
published the text of Milton Konvitz's presentation in the
form of an open letter to Daiches. It is reprinted with
permission of Commentary.]
Dear David,
Had your article in the February 1951 Commentary been
only an exposition and defense of agnosticism, it would
have awakened in me echoes of Thomas Huxley and Ber-
trand Russell, but I would not have felt myself personally
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involved. Your article, however, because it is your "per-
sonal view" of American Judaism, has started up in me
reverberations from some of the deepest layers of my mind; I
find myself profoundly and inextricably involved. For you
and I have had pretty much the same upbringing, experien-
ces, and education. My father, too, as you know, was a
distinguished Orthodox rabbi who enjoyed the respect and
confidence of both Jew and Christian; my education, too,
was in several cultures, sacred and profane; my career, too,
has brought me, in my vocation as a teacher, to an American
university campus. However, though I accept some of the
incidental things you say in your article, if your fundamen-
tal assertions are right, then I have been misliving my life; I
have gained from my background, experiences, and educa-
tion only a bushel of tares, while you possess the wheat. I
feel myself, therefore, personally challenged.
Cutting away some of the underbrush, I find that our
differences arise from our different attitudes toward tradi-
tion, particularly as to the function of tradition in Judaism.
Our differences here are over fundamentals.
One extreme view of tradition may be characterized as
the Platonic view. Plato held that the good is what pre-
serves, that evil is what changes. Change leads away from
what is perfect, the Form or the Idea; change tends toward
the imperfect, evil. Any change whatever, Plato says in the
Laws, "is the gravest of all the treacherous dangers that can
befall a thing-whether it is now a change of season, or of
wind, or of the diet of the body, or of the character of the
souL" This statement, he says, applies to everything except
to what is evil. Again in the Laws he says: "The lawgiver
must continue by hook or by crook a method which ensures
for his state that the whole soul of every citizen will resist,
from reverence and fear, changing any of the things that are
established of old."l In the Philebus Plato says "that all
men who have a grain of intelligence will admit that the
knowledge which has to do with being and reality, and
l. Plato, The Laws, Bk. VII, 798.
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sameness and unchangeableness is by far the truest of all." 2
An opposite extreme view of tradition may be character-
ized as the Emersonian view. 1£a man claims to know and
speak of God, says Emerson in his essay "Self-Reliance,"
and yet
carries you backward to the phraseology of some old moul-
dered nation in another country, in another world, believe
him not. . . . Is the parent better than the child into whom
he has cast his ripened being? Whence then this worship of
the past? . . . . When we have new perception, we shall
gladly disburden the memory of its hoarded treasures as old
rubbish. . . . This one fact the world hates, that the soul
becomes; for that forever degtades the past. . . . Say to them:
"0 father, 0 mother, 0 brother, 0 friend, I have lived with
you after appearances hitherto. Henceforward I am the
truth's. Be it known unto you that henceforth I obey no
laws less than the eternal law. . . . I appeal from your cus-
toms. I must be myself. I cannot break myself any longer for
you, or yoU."3
Emerson, who knew his Plato, was here, I believe, ans-
wering him by substituting one extreme view for another.
Plato was on a quest for certainty, Emerson was on a quest
for change. Plato identified the good with being; Emerson
identified the good with becoming.
1£ one is offered a choice between these two extremes, a
person with a warm attachment to life and experience must
do what Emerson counseled: break with the past com-
pletely, tell the dead to bury the dead, kiss one's parents
good-bye and turn one's face in the direction of the future
and the unknown.
In a way, David, it seems that this is what you have done.
The Orthodox Judaism of your father was, you say, "the
real thing." Judaism is that religion which you associate
with your father-"the full historical Judaism with its rich-
ness, its ceremonial, its discipline, and its strange beauty."
When you think of Judaism, you are a Platonist and would
put a curse on anyone who removes his father's landmark.
2. Plato, Philebus, 58.
3. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays, First Series, Standard Library Edi-
tion (Boston, 1883), 66, 72.
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Judaism is a perfect Form or Idea; it is unchanging; any
change is a step toward imperfection: "The men of old. . .
were better than we are now, and. . . lived nearer to the
gods."4 If Jews wish to continue as Jews, they should go
back to your father's shul, his way of life, and his ways of
looking at life and the world.
But you yourself, David, because of your intelligence
and spirit, find your father's ways and views no longer
congenial or acceptable. You, therefore, feel that you must
break with the past completely, and so you go over to
Emerson's side. For you, there can be no worship of the past.
You say to your father: "0 father, henceforward I am the
truth's." You have made the leap from Judaism to huma-
nism, from the dead past to the live present and future, from
being to becoming.
If Judaism is something that is finished, completed, a
Form that will not reflect anything that is alive and throb-
bing today and this minute, how could one blame you? If
Judaism is only a mummified corpse, what could you per-
sonally do with it except hack it to pieces, free yourself from
it, and run outdoors for a bit of fresh air and sunshine?
In a way, however, your position is extremely equivocal.
You still want the cake, but only for others to eat. Identify-
ing Judaism with your father's shul and home, you want
others to sustain it for "its richness, its ceremonial, its
discipline, and its strange beauty." For others, Judaism is a
Platonic Form, perfect in its being. But not for you. For
yourself, you are on an Emersonian ques t of becoming; you
shatter the past, you have disburdened yourself of its
hoarded treasure as so much old rubbish.
Now I say, David, if the choice were only between Plato
and Emerson, I would be on your and Emerson's side. But
you have narrowed the possible choice to two impossible
extremes.
There is a third way. It is the way of all that is best in
4. Plato, Philebus.
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Judaism. For a description of this third way I shall go to
T. S. Eliot's essay "Tradition and the Individual Talent"-
and I go to him rather than to, say, Solomon Schechter,
because his discussion will bring home to you the fact that
you have treated tradition in Judaism differently from the
way you would treat tradition in English literature or cul-
ture, for I believe you share the views Eliot expresses in this
essay.
Tradition, says Eliot, cannot be inherited as a dead
weight-the way a son inherits his father's house or his
books. The inheritance of tradition involves a number of
things. First of all, it involves the historical sense. This
sense involves a perception, "not only of the pastness of the
past, but of its presence." The historical sense "compels a
man to write not merely with his own generation in his
bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of
Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the litera-
ture of his own country has a simultaneous existence and
composes a simultaneous order." This historical sense is "a
sense of the timeless and of the temporal together." No
writer or artist can be seen as standing alone. "His signifi-
cance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to
the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you
must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the
dead."5
This is only one side of a two-sided transaction. "The
existing monuments form an ideal order among them-
selves, which is modified," says Eliot, "by the introduction
of the new (really new) work of art among them. The
existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for
order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole
existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and so the
relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the
whole are readjusted; and this is conformity between the old
5. T.S. Eliot. Selected Essays, 3rd ed. (London, 1951), 13-22; Selected
Prose, ed. John Hayward (London, 1953),21-30. Cf. Lucy, T.S. Eliot and
the Idea of Tradition (London, 1960).
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and the new." The past, then, "is altered by the present as
much as the present is directed by the past."
In Judaism we find-at least I offer it as my personal
view-both sides of the creative transaction described by
Eliot. We have the historical sense, which gives to Jewish
history a simultaneous existence and which composes of
Jewish history a simultaneous order. Let me illustrate this
point from the Passover Haggadah: "We were the slaves of
Pharaoh in Egypt; and the Lord our God brought us forth
from there with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm.
And if the Holy One, blessed be He, had not brought us
forth from Egypt, then surely we, and our children, and our
children's children, would be enslaved to Pharaoh in
Egypt." We are taught that every Jew in every generation
must think of himself as having gone forth from Egypt: "It
was not only our forefathers that the Holy One, blessed be
He, redeemed. Us, too, the living, He redeemed together
with them. . . ."6 The past, then, changes the present: I, an
American, have been redeemed from slavery and Egypt. The
past is significant to me not in its character of pastness but
in its existential presentness.
And the past in Judaism is changed by the present.
When Moses was shown the Torah as it was to be inter-
preted and applied by Rabbi Akiba many centuries later, he
looked at it in amazement and consternation, for he could
not-the rabbis tell us-recognize in it the Torah that he
transmitted to the Jews at Sinai.7 The Torah as it has passed
through the alembic of the minds of the prophets, of Maim-
onides, Saadyah Gaon, and of the thousands of rabbis of the
Talmud and of the centuries since then, has undergone
profound sea changes. "Turn it over, turn it over," we are
told, "for everything is in it."8 Judaism can no more be
reduced to a number of dogmas and practices, or even, as
you seem to intimate, to monotheism, humanism, and a
6. The Haggadah, ed. Cecil Roth (London, 1934), 11-12,36.
7. Babylonian Talmud, Menahot 29b.
8. Pirke Aboth, V, 25.
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sense of righteousness, than English poetry can be reduced
to a textbook of abstract generalizations.
In Judaism, then, the past is altered by the present, and
the present is altered by the past. Had you considered Juda-
ism in this light, you could not then have permitted yourself
to identify Judaism exclusively with your father's beliefs
and practices. To freeze Judaism into any form is to give
substance to Toynbee's charge that Judaism is a fossil; for it
means identifying Judaism with the past as utter and dead
pastness; it means inheriting Judaism from one's father as
one inherits one's father's house or books. There is only one
thing to do with one's father, and that is: to stand upon his
shoulders-and to see farther. For a child to carry his father
upon his shoulders is to identify his father with obsoles-
cence and to invite nihilism. "He who does not himself
remember that God led him out of Egypt," said Martin
Buber, "he who does not himself await the Messiah, is no
longer a true Jew."9
Let me for a moment look at this matter from another
point of view. It seems to me that an identification of
Judaism with the shul and the forms of observance of one's
father lays one open to the charge of idolatry. "And thou
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and all thy
soul, and all thy might." We have not been taught to love
our synagogues, or our kiddush cups, or our Sabbaths and
holy days, or our rabbis, or even the Bible or the Torah, with
all our hearts, with all our souls, and all our might-but
only God. (We are taught to honor our fathers and mothers;
we are not taught to love them with all our hearts, with all
our souls, and with all our might.) Holy places, holy days,
holy books, and holy men are important, but their impor-
tance is of a secondary, relative, contingent nature. To
identify Judaism with them is to confuse form with sub-
stance, shadow with reality. To worship the Bible is to
practice biblioletry-witness the Jewish judgment on the
9. Martin Buber, "Der Preis," Der Jude, October 1917.
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Karaites. To worship an infallible church or pope, or a
Sanhedrin, or a land, or a book,-or an infallible father-is
to love something other than God with all one's heart, all
one's soul, and all one's might.
It was Cardinal Faulhaber, though it could have been a
great rabbi, who said, "We cannot separate the Law of the
Lord from the Lord of the Law." To give centrality in
Judaism even to the Law of the Lord is to set up an idol.
Only the Lord of the Law is entitled to centrality as an
absolute.
This, incidentally, is one reason that I object to making
the Law of the Lord the law of the State of Israel, for it means
separation of the Law of the Lord from the Lord of the Law;
it means the intervention of a policeman between Jew and
God, and the displacement of God by the state. The inten-
tion of the rabbis is, of course, to enthrone God; but the
effect would be precisely the opposite. When you, David,
say that the separation of church and state in Israel may be
good Jeffersonian Americanism but is not good Judaism,
you are again fossilizing Judaism, refusing to admit that the
Judaism of thousands of years ago has been changed by the
centuries and the many millions of Jews-and non-Jews,
including Jefferson-who have lived and died since the
destruction of the Temple.
It is in a nonidolatrous, Jewish spirit that we observe
rites and ceremonies. "The commandments," said Rab,
"were given to Israel only in order that men should be
purified through them. For what can it matter to God
whether a beast is slain at the throat or at the neck?"IO Even
the Temple was used by our forefathers as an idol. "Trust ye
not in lying words, saying: 'The temple of the Lord, the
temple of the Lord, the temple of the Lord are these,''' said
Jeremiah to them. "I will do unto the house, whereupon My
name is called, wherein ye trust. . . as I have done to
Shiloh."11 To call a place the temple of the Lord and to trust
10. Genesis Rabbah, Lek leka, XLIV, I; Levilirns Rabbah, Shemini,
XIII, 3.
II. Jeremiah 7:4,14.
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in it in such a way as to displace God is to engage in
idol-worship. (We see here the essential reason that Jews
find it impossible to reconcile themselves to a religion
which says that the way to the Father is only through the
Son-or through the Church; for this means the positing of
an absolute alongside God. The Jew, per contra, says: the
way to the Father is through your heart and your deeds. Nor
does he add: and through your father's synagogue and his
0bservances.)
I want to quote to you a Psalm which you know very
well-Psalm 15:
Lord, who shall sojourn in Thy tabernacle?
Who shall dwell upon Thy mountain?
He that walketh uprightly, and worketh righteousness,
And speaketh truth in his heart;
That hath no slander upon his tongue,
Nor doeth evil to his fellow,
Nor taketh up a reproach against his neighbor;
In whose eyes a vile person is despised,
But he honoureth them that fear the Lord;
He that sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not;
He that putteth not out his money on interest,
Nor taketh a bribe against the innocent.
He that doeth these things shall never be moved.
I quote this Psalm not so much for what is in it as for what is
not in it. You will note there is not a word in it about the
Temple, about forms of worship, not even a word about
Jews or Judaism. And it was this Psalm which, according to
the rabbis of the Talmud, summarized the 613 command-
ments.I21t was in the spirit of this Psalm (and such passages
in the Bible are legion) that Saadyah Gaon said that he who
observes the commandment regarding honest weights and
measures may, for all we know, be as righteous as he who
observes the ritual commandments;I3 and that Rabbi Kook
held that the religious duty to labor for the Zionist ideal of
rebuilding Israel deserved the highest priority as a supreme
12. Babylonian Talmud, Makkot 23b-24a.
13. Saadia Gaon, Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. Samuel Rosen-
blatt (New Haven, 1948), 395-397.
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command of God.14 I cite these examples not to prove that
deeds are more important than rituals, but only for the
purpose of demonstrating that it is a falsification to give to
rituals or to any institution or to any person or book a
position of exclusive centrality in Judaism.
You, David, are no worshipper of ancestors, and no
worshipper of idols. Your intelligence is free and brave, so
you have shattered the image of Judaism which you had
projected upon the image of your father; and by shattering
one, you have shattered both. But you were wrong in the
beginning when you identified Judaism with your father's
thoughts and practices. Had you climbed up to your father's
shoulders, you would have seen farther-you would have
seen yourself as changed by him-and as changing him.
From the standpoint of a tradition that is not inherited as a
dead weight but that is alive and creative, it may be said that
even as he is the child of the man, the child is also the father
of the man. A sanctity, Santayana said, hangs about the
sources of our being; piety is loyalty to those sources; "it
must never be dislodged; spirituality without it is madness.
We must. . . suffer reflected light from other ages. . . to
lighten a little our inevitable darkness. "15This is the piety
that characterizes the direction of sentiment from son to
father. But this is only half the story. The other half is the
piety which characterizes the direction of sentiment from
father to son. Either half alone is impiety; the two taken
together give us a tradition in which the present is enriched
by the past and the past is enriched by the present, thus
saving us from nihilism as well as from idolatry.
Seen this way, Judaism is no hindrance to humanism.
On the contrary, it affords one a stance from which one can
say with Terence: Homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum
puto. Jews and Christians have been great humanists with-
14. See Jacob B. Agus, Banner of Jerusalem: Lzfe, Times, and Thought
of Abraham Isaac Kuk (New York, 1946), 63, 82.
15. George Santayana, The Life of Reason: Reason in Society (New
York, 1905), 174; "Apologia Pro Mente Sua," in The Philosophy of George
Santayana, ed. P.A. Schilpp (Evanston and Chicago, 1940),572.
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out feeling that either their religion or their humanism was
compromised. A proper perspective makes possible a per-
ception of the timeless and the temporal together, and of
man and God together. When a man knows with Saadyah
Gaon that God is "the God of all mankind," and that "the
worth of each man and his lot are equally precious before
Him," and with Ben Azzai that the verse in Genesis, 'This is
the book of the generations of Adam," is the greatest princi-
ple in the Torah,16 then nothing human-not even
agnosticism-can be alien to him. Judaism, as thus con-
ceived, stands committed to all that is open and free and is
the enemy of all that is closed and restricted. If you will say
that this is not the Judaism of your father and mine, but a
Jeffersonian Judaism, I will answer that I am not at all sure
that they were not Jeffersonian Jews. Though at times they
felt themselves possessed by God, they never acted as if God
were possessed by them.
You are inclined, David, it seems to me, to seek a simple
solution-total Orthodoxy or total assimilation-to a
problem that is very complex. Let me try to make my
meaning clear by a brief comparison between your father's
experiences as rabbi in Edinburgh (1918-1945) and my
father's experiences as rabbi in Newark, New Jersey (1924-
1944).
When your father came to Edinburgh, he found four
hundred Jewish families and two Orthodox congrega tions.
The call to your father came from congregations acting
jointly. After some years and much effort, your father suc-
ceeded in bringing together the two congregations, forming
a new, united synagogue.
When my father came to Newark, the synagogue that
called him had a membership of some four hundred fami-
lies. Newark then had an estimated Jewish population of
between sixty and seventy thousand (many thousands have
since moved to satellite towns). There was no census of
congregations, but I venture to say that there were no fewer
16. Genesis Rabbah, Bereshel, XXIV, 7.
102 RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND IDEALS
than thirty to forty Orthodox congregations, besides a
Reform temple and two Conservative congregations. In
addition to my father, there were only two or three other
Orthodox rabbis with smicha, that is, properly ordained.
But there were in addition many fakers-I use the term
advisedly-who professed to be rabbis: former Hebrew
teachers, shamosim (sextons), chazanim (cantors), and
shochtim (ritual slaughterers), a despicable crew of "reve-
rends" who were perpetually covetous of money and pub-
licity. They were a stinking abomination to both God and
man. Yet these fake rabbis had congregations, performed all
the functions of rabbis, buried the dead, and flattered the
living. They were constantly tempted to make a racket of
Kashrut. This was not very difficult in a city where there
were, I would say, between 125 and 150 butchers and many
poultry markets that catered to the Jewish trade.
It was not long before my father and his colleagues
found themselves in a life-and-death struggle. I am not
exaggerating. If I were to disclose the facts, our antidefama-
tionists would charge me with contributing to anti-
Semitism! (The record, however, of the kosher poultry
racket of New York City, in which the union of shochtim
played a prominent role, may be found in the proceedings
of the New York State courts.) That episode in my father's
life is one which I find extremely painful to recall; for at
least a decade my father had no sense of personal security,
and no inner or outer peace.
Now I submit to you, David, that it is not helpful to
judge the anarchic complexity of Jewish life in Newark (or
Chicago, or Philadelphia, or San Francisco) by the rela-
tively idyllic simplicity of Jewish life in Edinburgh. Going
home from Edinburgh to Newark is like going from
Walden Pond to Boston-or from Selborne to London.
There is, as Mr. Justice Brandeis said, the curse of bigness. It
is not merely that with bigness a small problem becomes a
big problem; bigness and smallness may be incommensurable.
Please note that what I am talking about is the large-
scale hefkerut, the utter disorder that one can find in a large
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Orthodox community in the United States, a state of affairs
that exists among American Jews who profess to adhere to
your father's sku/ and to his religious values. Orthodoxy,
then, is no guarantee against vulgarity, corruption, and
even plain criminality. To say to American Jews that they
should be Orthodox or assimilate, and to say this in a
context which implies that Orthodoxy will shield them
from evils which you associate with non-Orthodox Juda-
ism, is, I fear, to hold out illusory hopes. The evils we see
around us are not due to the fact that some Jews are non-
Orthodox.
Let me be clear on one point: Just as I am not attempting
to whitewash Reform and Conservative Jews, so I am not
attempting to blacken the repute of Orthodox Jews. My
intent is only to caution against the prescription of a cure
that is irrelevant to the malady. Just as it does not follow, I
believe, from what you have said, that Jews should not be or
become Reform or Conservative, so it does not follow from
what I have said that Jews should not be or become
Orthodox. The decision regarding religious commitment
should be made only on the basis of religious faith and
belief as to what best ministers to the individual's deepest
personal needs.
But you, David, seem to be advising American Jews to
base their decision regarding personal religious commit-
ment on institutional behavior; that is, on observation of
the way in which congregations and rabbis behave. You ask
them, in effect, to choose their religion on sociological
rather than religious considerations. The moral import of
your approach can tend only further to eat away the founda-
tions of Judaism. If followed, your approach would, in the
long run, contribute to deepened vulgarization and a more
widespread shallowness, so that ultimately we would all
become hollow men. In a word, you tell us to be or become
Orthodox, but for the wrong reasons-reasons which, if
taken seriously, would cause Judaism to crumble. It would
be both dry and empty.
There is, of course, much that is wrong, and even rotten,
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in American Jewish life. But this is equally true of Ameri-
can life in general (as it is true also of British, French,Asian
life, and of every man's life, wherever his local habitation
and whatever his name). Yet we do not, by any means,
despair of American life. Why, then, should we despair of
Jewish life in America? If we are not better than others, are
we worse? Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel saw no less
evil in their own days, yet they were prophets of hope as well
as prophets of doom. Their mission was to call for and
promise a renewal. American Jews today, as Jews every-
where and at all times, prefer the lesser to the greater good,
see the better but follow the worse. There is so much good
that must be done and so much evil that is being done that
one wishes to cry out, "But yet the pity of it. . . !"
One is torn between pity and anger-at oneself as well as
at others; but Judaism is committed to both anger and pity.
For just as pity alone may weaken the will so that it becomes
tolerant of evil, so anger alone may destroy the world-with
all the good that is in it and all its promise of good for the
future. It is not only Judaism but sanity that compels us to
stake all we have on the good, and on the future-
eschatological or natural. Judaism will yet flourish, even in
America-perhaps especially in America. There is much
vexation of spirit, and that which is wanting cannot be
numbered. Yet the crooked can and will be made straight.
Liberal and Illiberal Education:
The Founding of the New York State
School of Industrial and
Labor Relations-
A Tribute to the Founders
[On October 2, 1962, the new buildings of the New York
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, at Cornell
University, were dedicated. At the ceremonies, attended by
Governor Nelson Rockefeller and other public officials,
Milton Konvitz, on behalf of the faculty and administra-
tion, paid tribute to the two persons most responsible for
the founding of the institution and its location at Cornell
University-Irving M. Ives and Edmund Ezra Day.The
address was published in the July 1963 issue of the Indus-
trial and Labor Relations Review and is reprinted with
permission of the periodical.]
Soon after Horace Mann died, a public subscription for
a statue of him was undertaken, and Thoreau was asked for
a contribution. Although a friend of the Horace Mann
family, Thoreau declined because he thought that "a man
ought not any more to take up room in the world after he
was dead." But some men do take up room in the world after
they have died; indeed, some men, like Thoreau himself,
take up more room after their death than they did while they
were alive.
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The "room" that men take up is much more than physi-
cal space. In paying tribute to Irving M. Ives and Edmund
Ezra Day, at the dedication of this complex of buildings, we
could appropriately recall the epitaph to Christopher
Wren, written by his son and inscribed over the interior of a
door in St. Paul's: Si monumentum requiris, circumspice-
"If you would see his monument, look around." But as we
look around, we see a great deal more than what is apparent
to the outer eye. For the inner eye sees a school, an institu-
tion; and an institution is always, and above all else, an
idea; and an idea has its original home and its most conge-
nial habitat in the mind, heart, and spirit of a man. Emer-
son was, of course, right in stressing the truth that an
institution is the lengthened shadow of a man.
It sometimes providentially happens that several men
are brought together in such a way that their ideas, pur-
poses, and wills coalesce into an institution which absorbs
their diverse talents, so that they are made to move in one
direction toward an identical goal. Cornell University has
been singularly fortunate in such fruitful partnerships.
There was the original union of Ezra Cornell and Andrew
Dickson White, a pattern that was repeated some eighty
years later in the partnership of Irving Ives and Edmund
Ezra Day. I find these partnerships full of tantalizing antin-
omies. White and Day were the scholars, the philosophers,
the highbrows, the eggheads. Cornell and Ives were men
from the marketplace, the kings, the practical men. One
might naturally have looked to White and Day for the ideas,
and to Cornell and Ives for the practical implementation.
But we know that precisely the opposite happened. The
grand ideas, the far-reaching designs, the lofty and splendid
dreams came to Cornell and Ives. It was they who were the
philosophers, who spoke as if they had fed on locusts and
wild honey. It was the so-called practical men who brought
their dreams to the so-called scholars and philosophers; and
in the partnerships that were formed, the conventional roles
of these men lost their significance: the practical men had
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their heads in the heaven of Platonic Ideas, and the philo-
sophers lived and worked in the cave.
The truth is that each pair made up a single
philosopher-king; and it was perhaps for this reason that in
the process of realization, the grand designs were not muti-
lated or trivialized. In the precarious and tedious business of
execution in detail, the ideas, surviving the hard discipline
of reality, remained free and brave.
Now,.what was the high and pure idea that has become
the institution which is the lengthened shadow of Ives and
Day?
As the leading member of the New York State Legisla-
ture, Irving Ives discovered that, especially in our complex,
industrialized civilization, it is through work that a man
becomes and gets to know himself as a human being. For
only through work can a man risyabove the exigencies of
nature. Work, as Emil Brunner has said, "is the great and
dangerous privilege of man." And yet, when Ives looked
about him in his own great state, he saw that millions of
men were discriminated against when they sought to exer-
cise this great and dangerous privilege, which was their
birthright as men, because of their race, color, religion, or
national origin. This abuse and misuse of men made work
an ethical problem, and led Irving Ives to become the pro-
ponent of the Ives-Quinn law, the first state fair employment
practices act in the United States. For the first time in the
history of civilization, opportunity for employment with-
out discrimination became a civil right. Today there are
such enforceable laws in twenty states, and their reach has
in some states been extended to encompass education, hous-
ing, and places of public accommodation. By making
employment a civil right, and by establishing a special
agency charged with the duty to vindicate this right, Irving
Ives altered forever the whole horizon of civil rights.
At the same time Irving Ives saw that almost the entire
field of industrial and labor relations was excluded from
scholarship and teaching and was, more often than not,
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subject to imposture, dogma, ignorance, or lazy conjecture.
This was a paradoxical and indefensible situation, for
industrial and labor relations are of prime importance in
our culture and civilization, and if scholarship is truth-
truth about things that matter-then this situation could
not be allowed to continue. Ives and his Legislative Com-
mittee on Industrial and Labor Conditions-the so-called
Ives Committee-went before the legislature with a bill to
set up a school that would fill this vacuum. It was a daringly
creative idea, and one that was eminently appropriate to
what E. H. Carr has called the twentieth-century revolu-
tion: the expansion of reason. The primary function of
reason or the intelligence, as applied to man in society, is no
longer merely to investigate, but also to transform. This
heightened consciousness of the power of man to improve
the organization and management of his social, economic,
and political affairs by the application of rational processes
could not be stopped at the point where man achieves or
affirms his "great and dangerous privilege" as a worker.
Men with horse-and-buggy notions must have laughed
at this idea of Irving Ives; for there is always a cult of
irrationalism, there are always those who would not permit
the extension of the role of reason in society. But the legisla-
ture accepted the Ives plan; and Edmund Ezra Day and the
trustees and faculty of Cornell University gave the New
York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations "a
local habitation and a name." And thus, industrial and
labor relations, from an object of fear, revulsion, or indiffer-
ence, became a subject of serious study.
I would like to think that Irving Ives shared the spiritual
values of Thomas Jefferson, who, you will recall, when the
time came for him to draft his own epitaph, disregarded all
the great offices he had filled in Virginia and in the national
government, and wrote simply: "Here was buried Thomas
Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Indepedence, of the
statute of Virginia for religious freedom, and father of the
University of Virginia." Irving Ives, too, filled great offices
in his state and nation, and even one of international reach,
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yet, I think, he would want to be remembered as the author
of the first statute guaranteeing freedom from discrimina-
tion in employment, and as the father of the School of
Industrial and Labor Relations. That is greatness enough
for any man.
I venture to think, too, that Dr. Day, in taking steps to
bring this School into the Cornell University family of
colleges, acted not only in response to the demands of the
twentieth-century revolution, but also consistently with the
best in the classical tradition of education.
Aristotle's disdainful attitude toward work or practical
activity led him to the conclusion that subjects of instruc-
tion are "partly of a liberal and partly of an illiberal charac-
ter." All paid employments, he said, belong to the vulgar
arts, "for they absorb and degrade the mind." The first
principle of all action, he said, was leisure. Even in the
pursuit of liberal subjects, the freeman or gentleman must
preserve an amateur or dilettantish character. Leisure is
always higher than occupation; the power to use leisure
rightly is the basis of the freeman's life.
These views of Aristotle dominated education through
the mediaeval period. The main stream of thought held to
the belief that practical activity is to be shunned by the
pious man, who replaced the Aristotelian freeman, for prac-
tical activity was likely to attach a man to the world which
he should desire to leave. All practical activity, all work,
belonged to the world that followed the fall of Adam and
was part of the curse visited on mankind. The best that
might be said for practical activity was that it might be a
means of discipline against a sinful life.
But the classical tradition had another current of educa-
tional philosophy. Plato contended, quite simply, that if
theory is a product of mind, so is practice. There can be no
reasonable distinction between them, and so education and
the life of reason ought not to be confined exclusively to the
theoretical. To know a thing or an act is to know it as part of
an embracing order. There ought to be, therefore, no sharp
line between subjects of study that are "liberal" and those
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that are "illiberal." A liberal subject may be studied illiber-
ally, and a so-called illiberal subject may be studied liber-
ally. The difference is to be found in the teaching and not in
the subject. Thus, Plato's highest type of man, as soon as he
attains contemplation, was bound to return to action. The-
ory must be turned to practical account.
Cicero's thought was in the spirit of Plato when in his
speech for Archias he stressed the inner connection among
all branches of learning, among all arts which aim at
human culture and humaneness. "All arts which have any-
thing to do with man," he contended, "have a common
bond and, as it were, contain within themselves a certain
affini ty.
"
It was this Platonic attitude that, displacing Aristotelian
scholasticism, came to dominate the spirit of the Renais-
sance, of the Reformation, and of the intellectual, scientific,
and industrial revolutions of modern history. Erasmus, by
applying to the New Testament the principles of huma-
nism and scholarship, broke down the barriers between
sacred and profane learning, and made the Bible itself the
subject of serious scholarship. In the same way and spirit,
modern scholarship broke down the barriers between theo-
retical and practical studies, between the traditional "lib-
eral" and "illiberal" subjects. And so, gradually, and often
painfully, it came to be generally recognized that scholar-
ship is truth, whether the inquiry is secular or sacred, liter-
ary or scientific, theoretical or practical. There is truth in
the hitting in of a nail, or in thinking of the problem of evil,
or in finding a remedy for malaria, or in dating a Dead Sea
scroll, or in the conduct of a union meeting, or in the
solution of a mathematical problem.
This was an inevitable development, as we look back
upon the process now, for once the Bible and classical
literature ceased to be regarded as depositories of knowledge
of facts, once men ceased to go to Genesis or to Aristotle for
the facts of natural or social history, scholarship or the
search for truth became boundless in reach. Liberty of
thought became inextricably attached to the ideal of the
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unity of knowledge. And so it is natural that today theologi-
ans, giving the Bible a fresh reading, see that work or
practical activity was not said to be a curse on man, but
rather a fulfillment of God's order to man to subdue the
earth, so that it may serve his needs and ideals; and intellec-
tual history now traces Western civilization back to this very
will to work, to be practical, to create-a will that, as a
contemporary theologian puts it, "asserted itself in history
by breaking down the barriers which separated the 'merely
industrial' or 'merely useful' kinds of work from the
'higher' kinds."
Now, this complex development of ideas and of civiliza-
tion was, I feel sure, written on the tablets of Ezra Cornell's
mind, which he summarized in the phrase that is on the seal
of the University: "I would found an institution where any
person can find instruction in any study."
When Edmund Ezra Day asked Irving Ives to place his
School of Industrial and Labor Relations on the campus at
Ithaca and to make it an integral part of the University, he
acted in the spirit of Cornell and White, and in the spirit of
Plato and the humanists, and of all those elements of our
religion and culture that are alive and significant for life.
Day and Ives, knowing that work is a primary concern of
man and of society, and that a substantial aspect of civiliza-
tion is the system of relations among men who work, and
between workers, employers, government, and society,
founded a school of industrial and labor relations within a
university that does not recognize a classification of subjects
into "liberal" and "illiberal," or theoretical and practical,
or sacred and profane-a school within a university con-
ducted on the principle that narrow subjects must be stu-
died broadly and deeply, that theories must be tested by
practice, and that practical activities must be investigated
for valid empirical generalizations, for the "one in the
many" that they may contain.
The establishment of the School broke new ground in
American education. We who are intimately connected
with the School know that only men who have no responsi-
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bility have the right to leave ideas vague. We have the
responsibility to turn ideals into practicalities, and to seek
near-and even immediate-means to distant ends. We are,
however, not gods but men. We do not expect to complete
that which is by its nature an infinite task, or to find
perfections where only approximations are possible. And
so, while we are proud of our functions and purposes, we
are humble in the awareness of our imperfections and lim-
itations; yet we hope that, young or old, we shall never want
to take in sail, and that it will ever be our determination, as
it is our destiny, to strive and to seek to fulfill the ideas of
Ives and Day, for whom-with apologies to Thoreau-
there will ever be ample room in the world of living men.
Why One Professor Changed His Vote
[In the Spring of 1969 the Cornell University campus was
caught up in a turmoil that attracted national-and even
international-attention. Thousands of students, and some
faculty and staff members, had become aggressively activist
and militant, and there were subtle and open threats of
violence. In this setting, the University Faculty held a meet-
ing in which the atmosphere was tensely emotional. Milton
Konvitz, shortly after the meeting, sat down at his desk to
write a letter to his son Josef to explain what happened at
the faculty meeting and how he felt about it. In the course of
writing, the letter became an article, which was then pub-
lished on Sunday, May 18, 1969, in the New York Times
Magazine. The article is reprinted with permission of the
New York Times Co.]
This is being written the morning after. My estimate of
what happened on the Cornell campus in the last few days
takes its origin from "emotion recollected in tranquillity."
Yesterday, Wednesday, as I sat in Bailey Hall Audito-
rium, one of a thousand or more members of the university
faculty, and listened-part of me intent and part of me
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numb-to the statements by Hans Bethe, Clinton Rossiter,
Max Black and many other professors, in which they
pleaded for the faculty to rescind the reprimand imposed on
three black students for their conduct in demonstrations last
December and January, my mind kept reverting to Hobbes's
description of men in a state of nature- "a condition of war
of everyone against everyone." For days now we have had "no
arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, contin-
ual fear and danger of violent death." And the end of that
famous passage in Leviathan: ". . . and the life of man
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."
For, tragically and unbelievably, the campus had sud-
denly, in a matter of hours, reverted to a state of nature. As
we sat in the auditorium thinking, feeling, suffering and
half-heartedly engaging in some sort of uninspired debate,
we knew, from the expressed and implied threats, from the
temper of thousands of our students and perhaps three score
members of the faculty, that in a matter of minutes the
campus might become an armed camp.
We were asked by the Faculty Council to adopt a resolu-
tion nullifying the reprimands of the three blacks. Only two
days before, on Monday, the faculty, in the same auditorium,
had refused to accept such a resolution that was offered by
the dean of the faculty, Robert D. Miller, who had nego-
tiated the evacuation of Willard Straight Hall by members
of the Afro-American Society. On the surface, it seemed as if
we were being asked to declare on Wednesday that I + I = 3,
though on Monday we had said, firmly and decisively, that
I + I =2. Were we wrong on Monday? What new facts had
been presented to persuade us that we were wrong only two
days before?
This is how things looked on the surface, and my
impression was that the proponents of the resolution
offered by the Faculty Council failed to dispel the apparent
contradiction. Yet I had the feeling that most members of
the faculty at the meeting sensed, though they could not
express it, that the contradiction was only a verbal one. In
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fact, the issues on the two days were radically different, but
this was difficult to express and communicate.
On Monday what the faculty saw as they voted was an
agreement made while Willard Straight was still in a state of
siege, held by students armed with weapons. The dean of
the faculty explained that it was his belief that the black
students sincerely believed that they needed the weapons for
self-defense, for rumors had come to them of fraternity
members preparing to attack and oust them. He said that
the weapons were not a threat aimed at him. He did not, he
said, capitulate under duress exerted by the blacks against
himself, but under duress of the circumstances in their
totality, for he was afraid that, if the building were not
quickly evacuated, there was the great likelihood of danger
to life and property.
At the meeting on Monday he tried several times to
convey to the faculty the sense of urgency he had felt the
previous day, and he wanted the faculty to place themselves
in his position on Sunday, and to confirm as the principal
what their agent, using his best judgment, had presumed to
do.
But the faculty had a different picture before them. No
one criticized Dean Miller. Perhaps each one individually
might have done the same. No one said that he had acted
hastily and without judgment or warrant. But collectively,
they felt, they could not validate an agreement made under
circumstances which imposed so heavy a burden on the
mind and conscience of their representative. Even if the
guns were not aimed at Dean Miller, the seizure and the
weapons together meant force and violence aimed at the
university and the faculty, and this could in no way be
legitimated by expressly giving the blacks the fruit of their
violence and threats of violence, even if the threats could be
construed as meaning that they would use the weapons only
if attacked. For they were the ones who had used violence by
seizing the building, ousting, before 6 A.M.,parents of stu-
dents who were in the guest rooms, and ousting the
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employees, and guarding the doors to let no one into the
student union. Violence breeds or invites violence, and
when men start out to achieve what they want by strong-
arm methods, they must be prepared to face the unforeseen
consequences which may follow.
Some such line of thought, I think, must have run
through the minds of the hundreds of faculty members as
they voted to turn down Dean Miller's resolution. They did
not then have their eye on the judicial system or on the
penalties imposed on the three students. They thought only
of refusing to hand to the Afro-American Society the fruit of
its unlawful acts.
On Wednesday, as I sensed it, the faculty faced a radi-
cally different situation. Since Monday's faculty action, the
two days and the hours and minutes had been used by
leaders of the Afro-American Society and the leaders of
S.D.S. to heat up the students, with the result that anywhere
from 2,000 to 4,000 students (I think this is a fair estimate)
were ready to throw the campus into utter turmoil if the
faculty did not nullify the penalties against the three stu-
dents. They, and some faculty members as well, stood ready
to seize buildings, and after that there probably would have
followed acts of harassment against many professors and
administrators. For the spokesman of the Afro-Americans
had, in an inflammatory interview on Tuesday, which was
heard on the radio by thousands of the Cornell community,
branded the faculty as "racist" and named some professors
and administrators as "racists," and said they would be
dealt with accordingly. He gave the faculty until 9 P.M.on
Tuesday to act to nullify the penalties. The clear implica-
tion was that after that all hell would break loose. When
informed that the faculty would meet on Wednesday at
noon, he extended the deadline until after the meeting, to
see what the faculty decided. He said that the Afro-
American Society knew what its goals were, and that its
members would seek to achieve them by whatever means.
Thousands of students were waiting in Barton Hall to see
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what the faculty would do; several thousand of them had
slept there through Tuesday night.
On Wednesday at 11 0' clock, an hour before the faculty
meeting, more than 300 students of the School of Industrial
and Labor Relations, where I have been teaching for 23
years, held a convocation to which the professors of the
school were invited. Classes were suspended so that all
students could come if they wished to do so. Some students
wanted the meeting so that they could tell their professors
how they felt before they went to the faculty meeting; some,
perhaps only a minority, wanted the meeting in order to
hear what their professors thought. In any case, as I sat
through that session the message of the students came
through to me very clearly: they were in no mood to listen to
argument. With few exceptions they had made up their
minds firmly and immovably: The faculty must nullify the
reprimands or else. . . .
As the students gave thunderous applause to the student
speakers who shared the Afro-American and S.D.S. posi-
tion, I could not help but think of the philosopher Miguel
de Unamuno. After Franco had taken possession of the
universities, at a convocation at the University of Sala-
manca, where Unamuno was rector, he spoke out against
the rule of force and violence, but he was shouted down with
cries of: "Death to the intelligentsia!" I felt that I was
hearing thousands of students cry out: "If you don't do as
we want, death to the professors!" I had seldom in my years
of life felt such deep bitterness of soul, as if all my thinking
and working and teaching and writing had been nothing
but vanity of vanities.
And then I went over to Bailey Hall and the faculty
meeting. Little by little, as I sat and half listened and half
mused, it came to me that in fact what the faculty was facing
was not the Willard Straight situation. That was on Mon-
day; but now, on Wednesday, the faculty was facing the
wilderness, the state of nature as described by Hobbes. We
are no longer a civil polity-or rather we stood on the brink.
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We could have a state of war. The president had asked for
police to stand at the alert, and several hundred policemen
and deputy sheriffs had come in from outside the city and
county. But the arrival of police, as we know from events on
other campuses, in itself contributes to a state of tension,
and thousands of moderate students suddenly become mil-
itants as the police arrive. Possibly hundreds would be
injured, many perhaps seriously, some might get killed,
fires would be set, and worst of all it might take years, as at
San Francisco State College or at Berkeley, to reinstitute
peace and order and mutual trust and respect. A society can
be destroyed in hours, but it takes years to build one.
This, it seems to me, was what the faculty faced on
Wednesday. Unfortunately, the challenge came to the
faculty in a verbal formula which made it seem that we were
called upon to contradict ourselves. Actually, what we were
voting on was whether to have a state of nature, with all that
it implies for the present and future, or to try to renew the
social contract. But the formula for this, forced upon us by
the stUdents, was one that called for a nullification of the
penalties. To our students, and to the outside world, the
faculty action must look like a faculty capitulation.
And this is how it looked, too, to the three professors
who spoke against nullification. They had logical, orderly,
principled arguments and statements. If it had been a debat-
ing contest they probably would have scored high on
points. I listened to them with an open mind and was
almost persuaded, but then I shook myself and said: "These
men are right from the standpoint of an either/or logic. If
we were right on Monday, then what was right then should
be right on Wednesday. But this system of logic is not
applicable. There is a both/and logic that is much more
relevant.
"
We were right on Monday when the Cornell situation, as
we then saw it, focused on Willard Straight Hall. We then
were right in refusing to nullify. The Cornell situation on
Wednesday, however, was the whole of Cornell University
as a civilized, orderly community. The stUdents were ready
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to nullify the social contract if we did not nullify the repri-
mands. Under these circumstances the majority voted to
nullify-but, in fact, to refresh the social contract.
I voted for the resolution, but I could barely myself hear
my "Aye." It was almost as if I would gag on the word. It
was a very bitter pill to swallow. For I knew how eager
students will be to interpret the vote of the faculty as an
admission of weakness and cowardice, and how the world at
large will construe the vote as a craven capitulation. And
the Afro-American Society and the S.D.S. may in a short
time (there are only a few weeks left to the current academic
year, so perhaps there will be no further aggressive action
now, when students need to finish up term papers and get
ready for examinations) find new grievances-they are easy
enough to uncover or create-and escalate their demands.
There is no guarantee that what has happened once will not
happen again and again, and next time what the faculty
may be asked to agree to may be infinitely more important
than the nullification of reprimands on three students.
But life today offers little stability in any respect. The
quest for certainty ended some years ago. We live perma-
nently in an encircling gloom, and the kindly light that we
have is only a feeble candle of short-range vision.

Of Exile and Double Consciousness:
A Reply to Max Beloff
[The August 1979 issue of Encounter published a review of
Judaism and the American Idea. The review by Max Beloff,
noted English historian and political scientist, a professor
at the University of Oxford, led the editor of Encounter to
invite Milton Konvitz to submit a brief article that would
comment on the review. The article was published in the
October 1980 issue of the magazine. It is reprinted with
permission of the magazine Encounter.]
If my book, Judaism and the American Idea, is read and
reviewed-as was done by Professor Max Beloff-from the
perspective of the problem of anti-Semitism, then I can see
how it may impress the reader as the expression of "the
innocent optimism of an American Jew." But I would
gently protest that to read the book in such a confined
context is to subject it to a procrustean treatment. I had
thought that I had made it clear at the very outset that my
book was concerned "not with being but with ideals and
values"; that it proposed to describe "an ideal America" and
"an ideal Judaism"; that it was concerned with "human
ideals and rights." It is a book that should be classified as a
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history of ideas rather than as a sociological treatise. Only
in one chapter, "From Jewish Rights to Human Rights,"
do I touch the question of anti-Semitism, without, however,
departing substantially from the chief thrust and spirit.
But Professor Beloff has raised some significant and
sharply-focused questions. They touch the problem of
"roots" and "Jewish identity" (to use the terms of Prof.
Beloff's subtitle). He concludes with the challenging
statement:
"The ambiguity of Jewish experience and the claim to be a
people and not just a sect means that anti-Semitism is
inherent in its environment-Christian, or Muslim, or
Marxist. Pace Professor Konvitz, no Bill of Rights can
resolve the problem of Jewish identity."
I readily assent to the spirit, though not to the letter, of
this statement. Jewish existence is intrinsically ambiguous,
but this ambiguity is not necessarily a cause of anti-
Semitism. Nor is anti-Semitism the cause of Jewish ambi-
guity; for even if the Bill of Rights of the US Constitution
were fully observed, so that every American-regardless of
his race, colour, religion, or national origin-lives peace-
fully under his own vine and his own fig tree, the problem
of Jewish identity would still remain. A Gallup poll (con-
ducted in May 1979) showed that 12% of American Protest-
ants and 13% of Catholics thought that Jews were trying to
gain too much power. This was a significant drop from the
figures in polls taken in 1952 and 1965. InMay 19790nly2%
of Protestants and Catholics said that they ever had an
experience that made them dislike Jews. Even if polls and
other investigations were to show that there was absolutely
no prejudice against Jews and no instances of discrimina-
tion against them, there would still remain, I would say, the
problem of "Jewish identity" and the "ambiguity" of Jew-
ish existence. Just as the Emancipation and the Enlighten-
ment did not end the Jewish exile, the galut of the Jew and
of Judaism, even so the establishment of full peace and
security for the State of Israel will not end either the exile
(galut) or the dispersion (golah).
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For the Jew's destiny is existence in tension: to be, atone
and the same time, attached and detached: to be rooted and
yet transcendent: to seek harmonisation with his surround-
ings and yet be the critic and the prophet and to have no
resting place. The haunting verse of Henry Vaughan ap-
plies peculiarly to Jews: "God ordered motion, but
ordained no rest." No one so much as the Jew knows an
inner solitude. Emerson in his essay on "Fate" wrote of
"double consciousness." But who knows this double con-
sciousness better than the Jew? I can speak of myself as
being an American Jew, or as a Jewish American, but in fact
I am both an American and a Jew. The two coexist, often in
harmony, often in tension. I think ofthe poignan t outcry of
John Woolman, the saintly American Quaker: "In my trav-
elling on the road, I often felt a cry rise from the centre of my
mind, thus, '0 Lord, I am a stranger on the earth, hide not
Thy face from me.' . . ." The Jew is at home and a stranger.
He may be busy in the marketplace or office, on the bench or
in the legislature, yet at his centre there is a tiny heart of
loneliness and solitude. Like Hawthorne's minister who
always wears a black veil, the Jew has a private face which
he will not show the world. Jews live in a world of action
but often are not of it. They are a ttached to it, and yet a part
of them belongs elsewhere. In that elsewhere they know
each other, they embarrass and hurt each other, they com-
fort and keep each other, they strive and hope for each other;
in that elsewhere they are a people apart.
In that elsewhere they have, with Sir Thomas Browne,
"a glimpse of incomprehensibles, and Thoughts of things
which Thoughts but tenderly touch"; their heads are
lodged with immaterials, and they ascend (or descend) into
invisibles. For the Jew, there is no ease in Zion; life is
perpetual struggle; existence is actually or potentially pre-
carious; he sees life as constant motion, change, as conten-
tion and reconciliation, as damnation and salvation.
What I have said about the American Jew is, perhaps
with equal force, true of the Israeli Jew. He is at home in the
State of Israel. He is, at the same time, in exile, as is the
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American Jew, as is every Jew. Homelessness for the Jew
does not end with the attainment of freedom and equality,
and freedom from prejudice and discrimination-freedom
from anti-Semitism-in a free, democratic country; nor
does exile end with the attainment of national indepen-
dence and statehood in Israel. Like Jacob, the Jew is eter-
nally the sojourner. For the Jew, there is no normalcy, not
even in the State of Israel. He remains in exile, the
sojourner. The Israeli Jew, too, like Jehudah Halevi, can
cry out: "My heart is in the East, while I am in thefar West."
The Jews have always been wandering Israelites. They
wandered before they were banished. They were in the
Diaspora before they were in the Exile; the golah came
before the galut. "Our people wandered before they were
driven," says Joseph Kalonymos in Daniel Deronda; and
hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews, even sabras (native-
born citizens), choose to be wanderers, to be in exile in
America or Europe rather than to be in exile in Israel. "The
spirit bloweth where it listeth . . . ." It is no different with
the Jews who are fortunate enough to be allowed to leave
the USSR: some choose home/exile in Israel, some choose
to make their home/exile elsewhere. Why would they not
remain in their Russian home/exile? Because Russian
totalitarianism demands that the Jews, though identified
and marked as Jews, destroy one side of their double
consciousness-that they do what is for them an impossibil-
ity, namely, think of themselves as being altogether at home
and not at all in exile; in other words, though identified and
marked-and treated-as Jews, that they cease to know
themselves as Jews.
But the Jew, as easily as Kant, and almost by instinct,
knows the difference between phenomenon and nou-
menon, between the world of appearance and the world.as it
really is-das Ding an Sich. This puts him in constant
tension between the actual and the possible, between what
he sees and what he hopes for. In the Autocrat of the Break-
fast Table, Oliver Wendell Holmes says that in every dia-
logue between John and Thomas, there are at least three
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Johns and three Thomases: (1) the real John, known only to
his Maker; (2) John as he ideally sees himself, and often very
unlike him; (3) John as Thomas sees him, often very unlike
the real or the ideal John. (The same analysis can be applied
to Thomas.) One could say that every Jew is many men.
There is more than double consciousness in his case. (1)
There is the Jew as only God sees him. Maybe that is the real
man, the Platonic Idea of myself. (2) Then there is the Jew as
I see myself ideally, the man I wish to be, hope to become. (3)
The Jew I know myself to be phenomenally, with all my
foibles, my habits, my failings. (4) The self that I try to show
to my wife and family and friends, the self that is sharply
con trolled and moulded to get close to the ideal self I would
like to be. (5) The Jew that I show myself to be when I am
with other Jews. (6) The Jew that I try to be when lam with
non-Jews. I contain, I am sure, many other selves, a whole
universe of selves. And they overlap, and coexist, and are in
constant tension among themselves and among the multi-
ple selves of others.
Now I know that much of this is fully applicable to all
men, Jews and non-Jews alike, as the reference to Holmes
alone would indicate. In the story by Hawthorne, ''The
Minister's Black Veil," the speaker is a Christian cleric, who
speaks, in the following poignant passage, for the human
condition:
Why do you tremble at me alone? Tremble also at each
other! Have men avoided me, and women shown no pity,
and children screamed and fled, only for my black veil?
What, but the mystery which it obscurely typifies, has made
this piece of crepe so awful? When the friend shows his
inmost heart to his friend, the lover to his best beloved;
when man does not vainly shrink from the eye of his Crea-
tor, loathsomely treasuring up the secret of his sin; then
deem me a monster, for the symbol beneath which I have
lived, and die! I look around me, and 10, every visage a Black
Veil!
But the Jew, the man of multiple consciousness, is destined
to cover with his black veil more selves than are given to
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others. In a sense, every man is in exile; in a sense John
Donne was mistaken, every man is an island. But the Jew-
American or Israeli or whatever-is the paradigm of the
man in exile. The ambiguity of Jewish existence, the prob-
lem of Jewish identity, follows him wherever he goes or
rests or is driven. He cannot ever be the sailor home from
sea, or the hunter home from the hill.
